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In a global economy characterised by austerity, regionalisation and bidding 
for mobile capital, fiscal competition models have a major contribution to 
make to the economic development debate. With labour proving immobile, 
even within borderless regions like the European Union, our extension of 
static models into a dynamic setting offers invaluable advice for policymak-
ers. This paper presents the effects of fiscal competition, considering the in-
ter-temporal interactions among the economic activity of firms, capital taxa-
tion and public infrastructure investment in a small-open economy. Four 
cases emerge, but most interestingly public and private capital being substi-
tutes allows reductions in the net tax burden alongside infrastructure accu-
mulation provided public capital is not too productive. We also review factor 
complementarity, where subsidies become attractive. Transitional impacts 
depend on the marginal product of public capital. Hence, from the first case, 
our model addresses the apparent puzzle of high infrastructure accompany-
ing low taxation, and does so without imposing limitations on competition. 
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1. Introduction 
Post global financial crisis the world economy can be classified as one of regio-
nalisation, budgetary responsibility and organisation against the forces of globa-
lisation that dominated recent economic history. Mobility of capital remains 
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high, and governments seek to ensure this is attracted to their jurisdiction 
through competitive taxation rates and other suitable incentives. Inevitably this 
means public spending must fall, or the burden be shifted onto less mobile pro-
duction factors like labour. If nations can regionalise and agree to co-operation, 
then the large market is attractive to firms and there is no race to the bottom of 
the type predicted by most taxation competition models in the mould of [1] or 
[2]—a combination henceforth referred to as ZMW. However, as [3] [4] [5] and 
others, note incentives to compete dominate the search for harmonisation in 
Europe, despite attempts to harmonise taxes1 the community still sees competi-
tion between nations and a race to the bottom in all aspects of government poli-
cy. This is exactly as cautioned on early evidence by [6]. Hence whilst the global 
position may have evolved immeasurably, and solutions to the suboptimal low 
public spending problem have been sought since the early works, fiscal competi-
tion remains as relevant today as always. 
Oates (1973) nicely summarises fiscal competition “is not just a matter of in-
fluencing the decisions of a particular firm here or there, but rather that of es-
tablishing a favourable business climate the extent and condition of the trans-
portation system, the quality of local schools and the general structure and level 
of local taxes all influence business location”. Focus in the static taxation compe-
tition literature has thus fallen on the mobile factors, particularly capital, while 
the burden moves to immobile factors such as labour, with the result that capital 
tax rates, and public good provision, are too low. Despite several fruitful exten-
sions [7] [8] [9] the results remain limited by the key problem of a lack of time 
dimension. Results also fail to support observations that falling tax rates [10] 
have accompanied increased public infrastructure investment with improved 
quality [11]. However the unifying suggestion is that reducing competition, be 
that through co-operation as in the EU, promoting home country bias [12], or 
the existence of trading costs [13], can allow jurisdictions to get closer to socially 
optimal tax rates and public good provisions. [14] reviews the welfare costs of 
tax competition, noting that even co-operating jurisdictions do not achieve effi-
ciency. Empirical evidence meanwhile points to governments competing on 
many dimensions2, a seeming tension between theory and policy emerges. 
Where the static framework falls down is in its inability to account for feed-
back from taxation rates to the future investment environment. An attempt to 
link within a period is made by [16] who consider that infrastructure is tailored 
to individual firm needs and therefore can be thought of as a location in infra-
structure space with no attention given to the level provided. Though early 
overlapping generations models [2] [9] bring dynamic analysis, they necessarily 
ignore many of the externalities present in fiscal competition. One such example 
 
 
1Examples of tax harmonization quoted in [5] include the requirement for all EU nations to impose 
Value Added Tax (VAT) and the common consolidated corporate tax base (CCCTB), which states 
that one nation should impose taxation upon multi-national corporations and then reallocates cor-
poration’s tax liability across the nations in which they do business. 
2[15] study of German regional tax variation fits our small open economy framework well and illu-
strates how key neighbouring tax rates are to determining domestic rates. 
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is the feedback of capital stock size to interest rates through inter-temporal sav-
ings decisions [17] [18]. Equally capital can be thought of as a stock variable 
when dynamics are introduced, and again provide feedback to local economies 
[12]. Each of these papers puts forward potential for taxation to be too high, 
therefore reversing the race to the bottom conclusion of earlier work. However, 
unlike our work, all neglect the role of infrastructure and the other factors which 
attract capital investment. 
As suggested by [19] and DWZ public sector spending corresponds to ex-
penditure items such as infrastructure roads, sewers and the like or general 
training expenditures, all of which feed back into corporate profits and general 
well-being. [20] introduce this to the tax competition literature with a three stage 
game that allows countries to choose investment before competing in tax rate to 
win investment, making a high level of spending a norm alongside the low tax 
rate. Precisely this is observed in Eastern Europe [21]. Overprovision of infra-
structure could be seen as a benefit, making it one of the key suggestions of the 
economic growth literature for attracting investment [22] [23]. Inevitably the 
taxation burden rises, immobile factors such as labour footing the bill. Is the 
bidding to attract large firms a good thing? Indeed can such policies be sustaina-
ble? 
Two recurring themes in the literature to date are that labour is immobile and 
that governments therefore pass on tax burdens rather than borrowing. Whilst 
migration may play strong as a political issue actual levels remain low, even 
within regions purporting to have free movement of labour like the EU [24] 
[25]. [26] reinforces that in the European Union “while capital can take advan-
tage of permeable borders, national administrations and organised labour can-
not”. In the UK, as elsewhere, the post global financial crisis investment position 
is neatly summarised as “The government’ current fiscal plans mean that public 
finance for infrastructure is tightly constrained” [27]. In essence the UK gov-
ernment, like many others, are reducing borrowing in the age of austerity and 
will only fund based on taxation revenue. Such rules need not preclude growth 
or infrastructure expenditure, but there remains a strong sense that their relaxa-
tion would help nations attract more investment for growth without a restrictive 
tax burden [28] [29] [30]. Thus while both immobile labour and exclusion of 
government borrowing have vocal critics there remains strong evidence these 
assumptions in our model are empirically supported, especially since the finan-
cial crisis. 
This paper then contributes to analyse the effects of tax in an open economy 
where both stocks of private capital and public investment adjust dynamically 
over time and across jurisdictions. The degree of factor mobility is endogenously 
determined as a result of optimal behavior by factor users subject to adjustment 
costs. From an economic development point of view, the dynamic analysis is 
crucial to an understanding of the time frame over which tax incentives or other 
development policies can be expected to work, necessarily absent in the static 
analysis. Previous studies have examined some aspects of inter-temporal fiscal 
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competition3, though few have explicitly addressed dynamic adjustment of eco-
nomic resources. Our work is related to [36] and [37], which identify the mobil-
ity of capital and labour in a systematic way but not analyse the dynamic effect 
of tax change on the public infrastructure investment. 
Note that there are two directions of causality between public spending and 
private input. On one hand, the evolution of private inputs and variations in 
output can directly affect the size of the tax base and therefore the government’s 
capacity to finance new investment on public infrastructure. These concerns 
highlight the possibility of reverse causality. On the other hand, it is conceivable 
that public spending can also affect the demand for private inputs, as well as 
their marginal productivity, production costs, and, finally, the aggregate level of 
production. This study first models the reverse causality in a dynamic frame-
work where the public infrastructure investment, financed by capital taxes, is 
assumed to be publicly provided and external to the firm. Public investment di-
rectly affects the dynamic optimisation of the firm. We then present the tax ef-
fect in the short-, the long-run and the transitional period, considering the posi-
tive causality. 
This study shows that the system adjusts gradually to a long-run new steady 
state equilibrium, with effects on equilibrium allocations that depend on the lo-
cal production technology, cost adjustment technology as well as complementar-
ity of both private and public capital. There is no instantaneous tax effect on the 
capital stock. The marginal product of capital plays a significant role influencing 
the inter-temporal tax effects on factor stocks, the shadow values and the return 
rates. 
To illustrate the conclusions of the model a Cobb-Douglas production econ-
omy example is provided, allowing one to visualise the effects of fiscal policy 
change. We exemplify the case in which local capital taxation is increased. If the 
marginal product of capital is less than one, and public investment complements 
private investment in the production process, an outflow of private capital fol-
lows the change but this is accompanied by a rise in the public infrastructure in-
vestment. This fits the narrative of higher infrastructure spending emerging 
from later studies with limited competition. In the meantime, it decreases the 
return rate to both public infrastructure investment and immobile labor. Highly 
productive public investment may however crowd in private investment if the 
net capital tax rate is competed to the top, a concern not highlighted by static 
models. A second interesting result is the ability of labour to enjoy the benefits 
of increased business investment as wages adjust slowly to capital tax cuts. It is 
thus meaningful, especially in the present global economic climate, to distin-
 
 
3[31] discusses the problem of time-consistent taxation of mobile capital. [32] develop a two-period 
model of tax competition in which a pair of governments use debt policy to manipulate the in-
ter-temporal structure of taxation. Dynamic models of fiscal competition with imperfectly mobile 
households are discussed by [33] and [34]. And it is not uncommon for strategic fiscal competition 
to be formulated as “stage games” with sequential decision structures e.g. [35], though these typically 
focus on the determination of a single equilibrium of private and public choices rather than on the 
evolution of these choices over time. 
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guish between perfectly mobile and highly immobile factors of production in 
empirical study for policy suggestions. 
The paper proceeds as follows. The next section presents a dynamic model of 
a firms’ behaviour under costly investment adjustment with joint utilization of 
private and public funding, leading to an analysis of the dynamic responses of 
economic resources to the change of capital tax in Section 3. Section 4 provides a 
numerical example of the first-order dynamic effects of changes in capital taxa-
tion within the Cobb-Douglas production technology framework. Section 5 
briefly summarizes and discusses further applications and directions for future 
research. 
2. Competition for Mobile Resources with Costly Dynamic  
Adjustment 
The focus of attention is a representative small open jurisdiction, the group of 
which we shall refer to as “countries” though the analysis can just as well be in-
terpreted in terms of horizontal fiscal competition between lower-level govern-
ments within a federation. The dynamic model assumes no uncertainty, perfect-
ly competitive markets, and continuous time. 
The two imperfectly mobile production inputs tk  and tG
4 are called private 
and public capital, respectively. l  denotes the immobile factor of inputs in 
production. It is termed as labour in the current section for elaboration conven-
ience, though it could be interpreted as land or more specifically as different 
types of labour. The value of output within the jurisdiction at time t depends on 
three inputs, and is given by the strictly concave function ( ), ,t tf k l G  which is 
homogenous of degree 1. 
Local producers purchase inputs at prices that are determined in external 
markets and therefore taken as given within each small economy. Units of mea-
surement may be chosen so that one unit of each input has a price of unity. Cap-
ital goods may be thought of as a non-consumption commodity rather similar to 
the all-purpose numeraire commodity, as in standard macroeconomic and 
growth models. In the case where input is some type of labour or land, the fixed 
price could be interpreted as the externally-given net wage rate or net land re-
turn rate. Following [38], we assume that public and private capital are comple-
ments when 0
t tk G
f > . 
The private capital stock evolves over time according to ( )t tk i kδ= − , where 
ti  is the investment rate and δ  is the constant depreciation rate. Public capital 
is modelled as the accumulated tax revenues where t tG T kτ= + , with T  de-
notes the lump-sum taxes imposed by the local government on the household, 
who supplies one unit of a non-traded input called “ labour” at each moment. 
τ  is the time-invariant capital tax rate5. We do not allow inter-jurisdictional 
 
 
4[1] denotes G as the level of publicly provided services to businesses as an intermediate produce 
good. 
5The time invariance assumption of fiscal policy greatly simplifies the analysis but also restricts ap-
plication to individual rate change decisions. 
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borrowing, or lending, to preserve tractability and in line with the current aus-
terity drive. τ  and T  can be negative, corresponding respectively to the sub-
sidy and public expenditures on transfer payments or their equivalent. The pub-
lic input thus evolves according to G kτ=  . 
At each point in time, a representative firm chooses the optimal investment 
rate ti  to maximize its net present value of all future cash flows. The cash flow 
at time t is the value of its output, less the wage payment to workers, the bor-
rowing cost to capital, tax costs, its expenditures on investment and the asso-
ciated adjustment cost in investment6. The adjustment cost is measured by func-
tion ( )t tc i k , assumed to be nonnegative, strictly increasing, and strictly convex 
in the rate of investment ti , i.e., ( ) ( )0t tc i c i′ ′′> < . Also, ( )0 0c = . Note that 
the firm can borrow from the world market at the given interest rate r . The 
dynamic optimisation problem is formulated as (The time subscript t is sup-
pressed herein for simplicity, and labour inputs are normalised to 1),  
( ) ( ) ( ){ }
( )
0












         (1) 
G kτ=                                   (2) 
where w is the wage rate, and 0k  is the initially given stock of capital. 
Necessary conditions for the maximisation of Π  subject to the evolution 
equations can be expressed as (See Appendix A for proof of Equations (3)-(6)),  
( )1 2 1q q c iτ ′+ = +                             (3) 
( ), k Gw f k G f k f G= − −                          (4) 
( ) ( ) ( ) ( )1 1 2kq f r i c i q r i q iτ δ τ δ− = − + − − − + − + −           (5) 
2 2 Gq rq f= −                               (6) 
where q1 and q2 denote the shadow prices of private and public inputs, respec-
tively, in units of contemporaneous output. They summarise all information 
about the future that is relevant to a firm’s investment decision. A unit increase 
in the firm’s private input in capital stock increases the present value of the 
firm’s profits by q1, and a unit increase in the expenditure of publicly provided 
services raises the firm’s value by q2. Since we have assumed that the purchase 
price of inputs is fixed at 1, q1 is well known as Tobin’s q [39] and q2 is similarly 
the market value of a unit of public input to its replacement costs. 
Equation (3) states that the firm invests to the point where the cost of acquir-
ing capital equals the value of capital. It determines i implicitly as a function of 
q1, q2, and τ , i.e, ( )1 2, ,i q qφ τ= , satisfying  
1 2 21, ,c c c qτφ φ τ φ′′ ′ ′′ ′ ′′ ′= = = . 
The evolution equations of k and G plus (5) and (6) form a 4-equation dy-
namic system in the variables ( )1 2, , ,k q G q :  
 
 
6Examples of such adjustment costs are the costs of installing new capital and training workers to 
operate the new machines. 
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( )k i kδ= −                              (7) 
( ) ( ) ( ) ( )1 1 2kq f r i c i q r i q iτ δ τ δ− = − + − − − + − + −          (8) 
( )G i kτ δ= −                             (9) 
2 2.Gq f rq− = −                           (10) 
Let 1 2, , , ,i k G q q
∗ ∗ ∗ ∗ ∗  denote the steady state values. Equation (7), Equation (8) 
and Equation (10) imply that,  
i δ∗ =                                (11) 
( ) 1kf r c rqτ δ δ∗ ∗= + + + +                     (12) 
2G
f rq∗ ∗=                              (13) 
which uniquely determine the steady state of the system. 
3. Tax Impacts on Mobile Resources: Short Run, Long Run,  
and Transitional 
3.1. Comparative Dynamics 
In order to see how the change in tax affects the equilibrium private and public 
input, we first derive the variational equations. Assuming the system is initially 
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partial derivative ijf  at the steady state. 
As d dk τ  and d dg τ  are linearly dependent, the reduced-form dynamic 
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      (15) 
The necessary stability condition requires the determinant of the parameter 
matrix to be negative [41], that is,  
( )1 0kG kkrk f fc τ
∗ ∗ ∗+ <
′′
                          (16) 
Let iλ  ( 1,2,3i = ) be the eigenvalues of the characteristic matrix. They are 
respectively,  
1 rλ =                                   (17) 
 
 
7See [40] and Appendix B for details. 
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                 (19) 
where 1λ  and 3λ  are positive while 2λ  is negative. Using the boundary con-
ditions 0d d 0k τ =  and ( )lim d d d dt k t kτ τ∗→∞ = , which describe the 
short-run and long-run effects of the change in tax on the level of private capital 
employed in the local economy, we derive the solutions to the dynamic system. 
The dynamic responses of economic resources to the change in capital tax rate 
are given by (see Appendix C):  
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The main results are summarised into the table and presented in Proposition 
1 as below, 
( ) ( ) ( ) ( )
( ) ( ) ( ) ( )





k q G q
f sgn f sgn sgn f sgn
f sgn f sgn sgn f sgn





< − − = − − =
> + − = − = −
 
Proposition 1. Starting from an initial steady-state equilibrium, the impacts 
of an unanticipated permanent rise in the fiscal burden on capital depend criti-




∗ < , the stock and the market value of private capital will decrease 
monotonically to its new steady-state value. Providing that both private and 
public capital are complements, public capital will increase monotonically but its 
market value will decrease monotonically. 
2) If 1Gf
∗ > , the stock of private capital will increase monotonically to its new 
steady-state value, but its value varies indeterminately. Providing that both pri-
vate and public capital are complements, the public capital will decrease mono-
tonically but its market value will increase monotonically. 
The magnitude of the marginal product of public capital directly affects the 
impact of tax policy on the evolution of capital and indirectly impacts the eco-
nomic performance. In the empirical literature pioneered by [42] and [43], the 
estimate of elasticity of output with respect to public capital ranges between 0.34 
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and 0.39 using a production function approach relating output, employment, and 
private capital as well as public capital. These estimates were interpreted as im-
plying an annual marginal productivity of public capital of about 70 cents on the 
dollar. [44] reports that in the long term, aggregate public investment crowds in 
private investment and has a positive effect on private output with a long-term 
accumulated marginal product of $4.46, which corresponds to a rate of return of 
7.8%, a result that is at least three times smaller than the one initially estimated 
by [42]. Moreover, while there is little consensus in the empirical evidence about 
the magnitudes of the effects of public investment, there is also little doubt that 
they are positive and significant. 
At 0t = , these expressions shown in Equations (20)-(23) are equal to 0, cor-
responding to a “short-run” in which no resources are mobile. As t →∞ , the 
dynamic model describes, at its extreme, a “long-run” defined to be a steady 
state in which factor stocks are unchanging over time; equilibrium stocks of mo-
bile resources adjust exactly as predicted in the static tax competition model 
with two possible results-race to the bottom if 1Gf
∗ <  and race to the top if 
1Gf
∗ > . These definitions of “short” and “long” run appear to be the natural 
counterparts, in a dynamic model, “initial” and “new” equilibria that comparative 
static analyses are intended to describe. While understanding the short and long 
run effects of policy changes are positively and normatively important, much of 
the significant impact of policy occurs during the transition from the short to the 
long run. From the characteristic roots of the system derived from Equation (18) 
the equilibrium adjustment speed depends on the adjustment cost technology 
and the properties of the production technology. 
Proposition 1 indicates the signs of d dk τ , 1d dq τ , d dG τ  and 2d dq τ  
when 1) 1Gf
∗ <  and 2) 1Gf
∗ > . These give the effects of the net capital taxation 
burden on private capital, its shadow price, infrastructure spending and its sha-
dow prices respectively. By noting that it is possible governments may want to 
subsidise firms ( 0τ < ) we can motivate the results under taxation or subsidy. 
How effective any tax, or subsidy, will be depends on whether our two forms of 
capital are complements or substitutes, and how productive public capital ac-
tually is. Impacts are not instantaneous, but play out over time resulting in long 
run steady states, so all discussion must be qualified with this. Taxation can, 
should public capital be sufficiently productive, and the two forms of capital be 
substitutes, be imposed and not lead to capital outflow. Where 1Gf
∗ <  results 
indicate capital outflow and a fall in public infrastructure. As 1Gf
∗ <  increases 
above 1 the dynamic effect of fiscal policy on Tobins q in the transition period is 
ambiguous. 
Subsidies by contrast will be rational if the two forms of capital are comple-
ments. When public infrastructure is less productive such a subsidy applied for 
all time, 0t > , requires matching any reductions in the subsidy would reduce 
accumulation of private capital, allowing funds to be directed to infrastructure, 
and hence a lower market value of public capital. However, as public capital 
becomes more productive the subsidy causes a crowding out of private in-
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vestment. 
3.2. Tax Effect on the Speed of Transitional Dynamics 
In the above subsection, we demonstrated that the transitional effect of fiscal 
policy depends directly on the equilibrium capital mobility speed denoted by λ , 
the economic convergence speed in the growth literature (see [45] for example). 
Given the economic importance of what happens during the transition to the 
steady state, it is thus interesting to see how the change in the fiscal burden of 
capital affects the convergence speed. If the transition is rapid, we can focus on 
the behaviour at the steady state, where the comparative-dynamic response is 
discussed and most economies would typically be close. Conversely, if the transi-
tion is slow, economies would typically be far from their steady states, and, 
hence, the comparative-dynamic analysis would be dominated by the transition-
al dynamics. 
Consider a log-linear approximation of the dynamic systemof ( )1 2, , ,k q G q  
in the neighborhood of the steady-state8. After some calculations and manipula-
tions, the β-convergence speed is given by: 
( ) 2
2
d d ln ln









∗ ∗ ∗ ∗
= − − = −
′′ ′′= − + − − +
             (24) 
The time paths for ln k  and ln G  are respectively:  
( ) 0ln 1 e ln e lnt tk k kβ β− ∗ −= − +                     (25) 
( ) 0ln 1 e ln e lnt tG G Gβ β− ∗ −= − +                    (26) 
Thus, for any 0t ≥ , ln k  is a weighted average of the initial and steady state 
values, 0ln k  and ln k
∗ , with the weight on the initial value declining exponen-
tially at the rate β. To differentiate the β-convergence speed with respect to the 












∗∗ ∗ ∗ ∗
∂
= −
′′∂ ′′ ′′− −
             (27) 
Hence: 
Proposition 2. If private and public capital are independent, the economic 
convergence speed is not affected by the fiscal policy setting; Providing that they 
are complements, a permanent increase in the capital tax rate reduces the eco-
nomic convergence speed, i.e., ( ) ( )Gksgn sgn fβ τ ∗∂ ∂ = −  
Empirical evidence concurs that the two types of capital are complements and 
hence for policy makers looking raise taxation a longer period of transition can 
be expected. Meanwhile our model also suggests that governments finding 
themselves with a marginal product of public capital above 1 can not only enact 
a low tax, high infrastructure regime, but will see that achieved quicker. 
 
 
8The advantage of the log-linearization method is to get a closed-form solution of the convergence 
coefficient. The disadvantage is that it applies only as an approximation around the steady state. 
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4. A Cobb-Douglas Economy 
By assuming that the production function is locally well approximated by a 
Cobb-Douglas function of one immobile factor-labour, and two imperfectly 
mobile factors-public and private capital, we can further motivate the theoretical 
discussion. Proportions are fixed at 0.2, 0.7 and 0.1 for private capital, labour 
and public capital respectively. China’s GDP and tax revenue data suggests 
0.3τ = , but this is large compared to U.S. data9. For convenience we add 1k∗ =  
and 0.03r = 10. 
When relevant parameter values are specified, we calculate numerically the 
values of the derivatives in Equations (20)-(23). Figure 1 plots the values of the 
derivatives of factor stocks and their market values with respect to a fiscal policy 
parameter-capital tax rate, which indicates the comparative dynamic response to 
an increase in the fiscal burden on capital for both the baseline values of capital 
adjustment cost parameter( 1 1c′′ =  and 1 5c′′ = )
11. The figure shows clearly that 
the stock of private capital falls while the stock of public investment rises with an 
increase in the net capital tax in the long run. Comparatively, the market value 
of both private capital and public investment will fall contemporaneously with 
an increase in net capital taxation. But the market value of private capital does 
not fall monotonically to its new steady state. We can also observe that the ad-
justment in factor stocks takes a longer time than their market values although 
most responses occur within 25 years of a policy change. Comparing the pairs of 
dotted lines with the solid ones, it is shown that the lower the adjustment cost, 
the larger the speed of adjustment of the system. In such scenarios there is less 
incentive to defer adjustment to policy changes. 
Discussions on factor return rates are equally important in the model and are 
of greater economic interest for policy makers. If the economy is assumed to 
start in a steady state with the same set of parameter values, we may compute the 
paths of kf , Gf , and w, resp., denoting the gross return rates to private capital, 
public investment and labor. If the immobile factor is interpreted as land, then w 
may refer to the land return rate. Derived from Equation (4), Equation (8) and 
Equation (10), the time paths of change in gross return rate in factor in response 
to a change in capital tax are given by: 
1 2d d d dd d d1 , and
d d d d d d d
k G k Gf f f fq q wr r k G
τ τ τ τ τ τ τ
= + = = − −         (28) 
Given the assumed parameter values, these expressions can be calculated nu-
merically using Equation (22) and Equation (23). 
Figure 2 presents the transitional effect of the policy change in the gross re-
turn rates of private capital, public infrastructure investment and labour, which 
 
 
9These figures can be adapted to different circumstances corresponding to fiscal systems for differ-
ence levels of governments in different nations at different periods of time. 
10The choice of an interest rate r amounts essentially to the choice of unit of time. 
11
1 1c′′=  and 1 5c′′=  as plausible baseline values in the absence of firmly-established empirical esti-
mates for such parameters, roughly in accordance with empirical findings on the speed of adjust-
ment of capital stocks, as discussed, e.g. in [46]. 
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Figure 1. Dynamic effects of capital tax increase on factor stocks and market values. 
 
 
Figure 2. Dynamic effects of capital tax increase on factor return rates. 
 
cannot occur in static models, retaining the baseline value for all ( 1 1c′′ =  and 
1 5c′′ = ). The return rates of public investment and labour both suffer a reduction 
that persists for some years corresponding to a rise in the capital tax rate, though 
the response of gross return rate of private capital to the policy change is positive. 
Similarly, the return to the long-run level factor return rate is much faster when 
the assumed cost of adjustment is lower. 
Utilising different parameter values produces intuitively similar results, but 
with the speeds of adjustment and hence precise role of dynamic analysis being 
varied. Exploiting the dynamic framework allows a consideration of the convex-
ity of the adjustment cost function for each factor, more convex forms meaning 
more protracted adjustment to changes in fiscal treatment. However, the transi-
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tion process still remains in all cases and its study remains of great importance 
to policy makers. To optimise use of our framework attention must be given to 
the likely convexity as well as the precise calibration and policy environment of 
the model. From the above we do now have a simple visualisation of the 
processes discussed in the analytical sections, and a footing on which further 
empirical work could grow. 
5. Concluding Remarks 
In a world classified by the rival forces of promoting inward investment and ba-
lancing budgets we see low capital taxes, high infrastructure spending and na-
tions not borrowing to fund this. Extending static fiscal competition models af-
ter ZMW we show a dynamic framework in which precisely the observed pattern 
emerges in the set of equilibria. Key to enabling taxation to be imposed without 
deterring private capital is that public capital be sufficiently productive and there 
be a substitutability between the two sources. By detaching the direct link be-
tween private capital and its taxation rate many of the original results from the 
static literature are revisited. Dynamic models also enable us to show adjustment 
speeds and offer valuable insight to policymakers evaluating their taxation rates 
in light of the possible gains identified above. For the Cobb-Douglas economy 
much of the change was within one economic cycle, suggesting that incumbent 
governments may see the benefits on their own watch. Meanwhile, should public 
capital be less productive we move back to the initial two period results, but now 
with dynamic motivation. 
In order to achieve high infrastructure spending at the same time as having 
low capital taxation, another factor must pay the price-immobile labour, or land. 
Despite open borders in the EU and elsewhere it is still true that migration per-
centages are low and this shift of the tax burden looks sustainable. Nations can 
continue to compete themselves further into this problem, or harmonise rates in 
regions. Advantages to labour of this are clear, but individual governments mo-
tivations to attract capital inflow remain stronger. Opening up the possibility of 
borrowing to fund investment would allow taxation on sticky factors to fall, but 
goes against the austerity mood. Consequently our dynamic extension, and con-
sideration of infrastructure spending, provides a clear recreation of observed 
practice and reacquaints the fiscal competition literature with policy agendas. 
Further by exploring investments carefully our set up shows that a race to the 
top can be achieved, something leaders will inevitably be keen upon. Many sig-
nificant policy implications thus result. 
Many economists extol the virtues of increasing infrastructure to provide a 
platform for growth, and support for borrowing is strong. Shifting the burden 
from labour is appealing but may have consequences for future generations to 
meet this debt. Extending our framework to permit borrowing will thus be in-
formative to the austerity debate, and illustrate under what circumstances higher 
output can be created than current legislation permits. However, by reflecting 
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the contemporary global climate, and from the associated tractability of balanced 
budgets, we are able to contribute greatly to the discussion as is. Our 
Cobb-Douglas economy is only the tip of an explanatory iceberg, and scope ex-
ists for calibration of these illustrative cases. Through so doing a stronger mes-
sage might be conveyed in terms of what fiscal policy might achieve and what 
benefits regional harmonisation might bring. In all sense the transition to dy-
namic framework will prove a vital stepping stone, and our model a strong 
foundation on which to build. 
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Appendix A. Derivation of Equations (3)-(6) 
Define the Hamiltonian of the dynamic optimization problem in Section 2.  
( ) ( ) ( ){ } 1 2, e rtH f k G w r k i c i k v k v Gτ −= − − + − + + +           (A.1) 
where 1v  and 2v  denote the co-state variables associated with the state va-
riables k and G. The transversality condition is  
1lim 0t v k→∞ =  and 2lim 0t v G→∞ = . 
The current value Hamiltonian is 
( ) ( ) ( ) ( ) ( )1 2,cH f k G w r k ik kc i q i k q i kτ δ τ δ= − − + − − + − + −   (A.2) 
where 1 1e
rtq v= , and 2 2e
rtq v= . 




c cH H c i
i i
∂ ∂ ′′= = − <
∂ ∂
                   (A.3) 














                         (A.6) 
Solving from Equations (A.3)-(A.6), produces Equations (3)-(6). 
Appendix B. The Method of Variational Equations and  
Derivation of Equation (14) 
In Section 3, the state of the system depends on the capital stock k, the public 
input stock G and their shadow values. Differentiation of Equations (7) to (10) 
assuming that the system is initially in equilibrium gives four first-order diffe-
rential equations in  
( )1 2d d ,d d ,d d ,d dt t t tk q q Gτ τ τ τ   
with respect to time t,  
1 2
11 1 1 1 1 1 2 1
1 2





kk k k k q k G k q k
qq q k q q q G q q q
GG G k G q G G G q G
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                    (B.2) 
To differentiate Equation (8), with respect to ( )1 2, , ,k q G q , we get 
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                       (B.5) 
Using the method of variational equations introduced above, with  
1 2 21, ,c c q c τφ φ τ φ′′ ′ ′′ ′ ′′ ′= = = , 
and substituting the steady-state values expressed in Equations (11)-(13), into 
Equation (B.1), we then get Equation (14). 
Appendix C. Derivation of Equations (20)-(23) 
The general solution to the dynamic system (15) can be expressed as 
( ) ( ) ( )
( ) ( ) ( )
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1 2 3
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               = +                  
        (C.1) 
where ( ) ( ) ( )1 2 3, ,a a a  are the column eigenvectors corresponding to above eigen-
values 1 2,λ λ  and 3λ . 1d d ,d dk qτ τ
∗ ∗  and 2d dq τ
∗  are the particular solu-
tions to the dynamic system (15), i.e., the steady state equilibrium values in the 
long run. Through manipulation and calculation,  
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Equation (C.1) therefore changes to 
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 (C.4) 
Substituting boundary conditions 0d d 0k τ = , and  

























                       (C.5) 
Given 1 2,A A  and 3A , the solutions to the dynamic system, that is, Equations 
(20) to (23) are obtained. 
